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Abstract 
 
This article discusses communication concepts associated with the practice of 
public diplomacy 2.0, applying those concepts to analysis of American 
implementation of PD 2.0 directed toward Iran, a country with which the United 
States has lacked formal diplomatic relations for more than 30 years. Although 
interaction between the United States and the Iranian people may be limited, 
may not always take place in real time, and certainly cannot serve as a substitute 
for the interactions facilitated by a bricks-and-mortar embassy on the ground, the 
Virtual Embassy Tehran and its social media accouterments represent an 
interesting application of American public diplomacy priorities. The effort is 
consistent not only with the goals of 21st Century Statecraft, but also with the 
Administration’s stated preference for engagement while still pursuing vigorous 
economic sanctions toward the Iranian regime. The effort also has potent 
symbolic value given the United States’ promotion of global internet freedom as a 
foreign policy goal. The case of American engagement with the Iranian people as 
examined here is a unique study in the practice of public diplomacy 2.0 and it 
offers an opportunity to test some of the more idealistic arguments associated 
with application of social media to diplomatic efforts. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In an age of rapidly evolving communication technologies, enthusiasm about new 
techniques for outreach can overtake attention to constructing the message to be 
conveyed. This tendency was common in discussions about the 2008 
presidential election, prompting internet doyenne Arianna Huffington to offer the 
following corrective to analysis about Senator John McCain’s presidential bid and 
his campaign’s use of communication technology: “The problem with the McCain 
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campaign was… the age of the ideas dominating the campaign” (2008). It was 
the content of Senator Barack Obama’s campaign messages, Huffington 
concludes, not the means through which they were delivered, that won the 
election for the senator from Illinois. The technology may have been useful, she 
cautioned, but it was the ideas that mattered. 
 
Conventional wisdom about public diplomacy similarly assumes the advent of 
online social interactive media has revolutionized the practice of the craft. But it is 
still the message that matters. The arguments supporting declarations of a 
changed diplomatic landscape are familiar and derive from the well-established 
internet optimism versus internet pessimism debates spanning from the 1990s to 
today: The internet is a universally democratizing force; the higher the internet 
penetration rate the greater the diversity of voices to be heard; harnessing the 
power of the internet guarantees political success; and compelling ideas powered 
by social media cannot fail.                                   
 
But lacking both formal theories to guide the practice (Entman, 2008; Gilboa, 
2008; 2009) and effective mechanisms to evaluate policy once implemented 
(Banks, 2011; Gilboa, 2009; Pahlavi, 2007; Steven, 2007), discussions about 
public diplomacy and the use of social media therein struggle to offer more than 
anecdotal evidence and a demonstrated affinity for cool tech trends. Social 
media may be increasingly deployed by the United States Department of State in 
the name of public diplomacy, but to what end? 
 
This article looks beyond the received wisdom of social media and its place in the 
practice of public diplomacy and digs into the emerging body of peer-reviewed 
literature about the application of social media tools to policy and political 
contexts. It continues with discussion of American efforts to deploy the tools of 
social media for the purposes of public diplomacy in the case of Iran. It concludes 
that social media has great potential for the practice of public diplomacy, but 
learning to exploit its full range of benefits will require both time and a 
commitment to focusing on engagement.	  
 
Is the medium the message? 
 
Alec Ross, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s Senior Advisor for Innovation 
writes “Diplomacy in the 21st century must confront both the potential and the 
limits of technology in foreign policy and respond to the disruptions it causes in 
international relations” (2011, p. 455). That disruptions typically accompany the 
introduction of new technologies is a given. How those disruptions will ultimately 
affect international politics and diplomatic practice is far from predictable. There 
is always a degree of hyperbole involved in discussions about the influence of 
emerging communication technologies and conversation about social media’s 
use for the purposes of public diplomacy 2.0 has not been immune to this 
tendency. 
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There is potential for practitioners to have access to many more thoughts, 
perspectives, ideas and opinions from different places around the world than 
have previously been available. Public diplomacy -- by definition, the efforts to 
reach out directly to populations of foreign countries by sidestepping their 
governments and the confines of traditional diplomacy -- is ideally suited for 
exploiting social media’s interactive characteristics. Although simply employing 
the tools that facilitate those conversations is not enough, much of the discussion 
about social media’s public diplomacy potential focuses on the adoption of the 
technology rather than on the creation of content or the emphasis on engaging 
with the intended audience.  
 
Thoughtful analyses of public diplomacy and its place in a country’s foreign policy 
strategy suggest looking beyond simple adoption of interactive communication 
tools for sharing America’s story with the world (Hayden, 2011; Lord, 2008). Such 
analyses also urge caution in use of the term “engagement.” Philip Seib calls it 
“mushy” and worries that it can be mistaken for a policy goal unto itself (2012, p. 
121). The emphasis on style over substance is not unique to the field of public 
diplomacy as earlier discussion of the 2008 presidential campaign demonstrated. 
As noted above, rhetoric surrounding the 2008 presidential campaign focused on 
the novelty of the tools rather than the substance of message being promoted. 
 
Enthusiasm for the role of social media in the practice of public diplomacy may 
have been similarly overplayed in the American policy environment. It is true that 
the Department of State is recognized as one of the most tech-savvy foreign 
ministries in the world (Crouch, 2012), but in a public presentation celebrating the 
Department’s practice of PD 2.0, examples of outcomes were limited to numbers 
of followers, numbers of tweets and plans to get more of both (New America 
Foundation, 2012). There are, for example, 10 official State Department policy-
oriented Twitter feeds in foreign languages and another in English. State now 
experiments with Twitter briefings, inviting people to submit questions in 
advance, with the spokesperson responding to those questions at a later briefing 
and via Twitter.  
 
There was also a recent contest among foreign posts challenging embassies to 
increase their numbers of followers on a variety of social media sites. The effort 
resulted in an increase of State’s followers from a few hundred thousand to more 
than 4 million. A forthcoming contest plans to identify 20 embassies to receive 
consulting services from visiting teams of technology experts to help the selected 
posts apply lessons learned from the aforementioned follower drive and further 
improve their local social media presence. This approach to public diplomacy and 
more generally to the adoption of social media by established institutions has led 
one internet realist to wryly observe, “If a tree falls in the forest and everyone 
tweets about it, it may not be the tweets that moved it” (Morozov, 2011, p. 16). 
 
Public diplomacy efforts are notoriously difficult to evaluate (Banks, 2011) and 
the temptation has long been to assume that quantity is quality. Calculating 
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numbers of followers is a useful metric for determining potential audience reach, 
but it offers no insights into the quality of the communications. It also does not 
guarantee that the communication has evolved to include engagement. Indeed, 
one participant on the New American Foundation panel mentioned above 
acknowledged, “We need to start listening.” 
 
Recalling historian Nicholas Cull’s mantra that listening is the most important part 
of public diplomacy (2011), one worries the continued focus on the number of 
social media sites in which the Department is engaged and the number of 
followers the Department has is being mistaken for evidence of public diplomacy 
success. In reality, such numbers are necessary but not sufficient for public 
diplomacy success in the current communication ecosystem. As Seib writes “The 
big question, to which there is not yet a definitive answer, is, does this 
technology-based approach work better, or at least as well as more traditional 
contact techniques?” (2012, p. 121). 
 
 
Understanding social media 
 
It may be possible to glean insights from other disciplines studying the role of 
social media. The field of political communication, for example, has produced 
numerous studies examining the place of social media like Twitter and Facebook 
in the conduct of both political campaigns and governance. Henry Farrell, for 
example, summarizes many of those findings arguing it is clear the internet has 
an effect but that researchers and policymakers must consider the technology as 
part of a broader context, not as a factor by itself. He recommends integrating 
knowledge of the internet’s effects with ongoing policy debates, exploiting the 
new availability of data and exploring the mechanisms through which the internet 
plays a role in cause and effect (2012). Communication scholar James Curran 
and co-authors accordingly urge caution, suggesting “a narrow, decontextualized 
focus on the technology of the internet leads to misperceiving its impact” (Curran 
et al, 2012, p. 179). 
 
There are few calls for this kind of moderation in current discussions about the 
role of social media in the American practice of public diplomacy. A recent 
example of unmitigated optimism surrounding the applications of technologies is 
the discussion of events widely known as Arab Spring. In the heat of the 
moment, conventional wisdom, promoted by media coverage and policy analysis, 
declared social media to be largely responsible for the protests. Since then, 
others have suggested that attributing the protests to the technology sells the 
protesters short (Gladwell, 2011).  
 
Moreover, the facts suggest traditional media such as television in the form of Al 
Jazeera played a key role, tracking the social media environment, but then 
broadcasting information through more typical channels (Seib, 2012). So while 
some have been quick to attribute the unrest to social media, the reality is more 
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likely to have been transmission of information through a well-understood 
communication dynamic known as the two-step flow. This is not new. It is instead 
a recognized mechanism applied to a new context. Practitioners of public 
diplomacy would be wise to remember that social media is operating in a broader 
communication ecosystem, the dynamics of which are well understood. 
 
Discussing social media generally, New York University professor Clay Shirky 
writes that the disruptions associated with social media stem from individuals’ 
ability to organize without organizations (2008). Recent research places social 
media on a spectrum of communication tools saying it “is located somewhere 
between the formal and informal communication sources…” (Solomon, 2012, p. 
2). That study notes, “online social networks change the relationship between the 
population and sources of information…” (p. 3). A well-known social media expert 
similarly declares, “One of the greatest lessons in social media is that everything 
begins with listening… Not only are new media channels rich with insight, they 
are also interactive. There are people on the other side who have expectations 
of… engagement” (Solis, 2011). This restates journalism scholar Jay Rosen’s 
observations about the “former audience” and the effect of access to interactive 
media on the part of previously passive recipients of information (2006).  
 
The subsequent disruption of traditional communication models and the ability of 
people to organize without organizations naturally render interactive media 
appealing to practitioners of public diplomacy. But interactive media is, by 
definition, about more than the ability to operate the modern equivalent of one’s 
own printing press. It is used to fullest advantage when conversation flows in 
both directions. Seib emphasizes this fact, stating “The interactive nature of 
social media underscores the importance of listening because the time is long 
past when one-way pronouncements rather than balanced conversation could 
suffice” (2012, p. 107-108). 
 
Information revolutions in context 
 
Historian Robert Darnton observes “The marvels of communication technology in 
the present have produced a false consciousness about the past – even a sense 
that communication has no history” (2010). Journalism scholars Bill Kovach and 
Tom Rosenstiel offer similar insight regarding the assumption that modern 
communication technology changes are the most significant in history. Instead, 
they remind readers that there have been significant disruptions in 
communication technology before, beginning with the development of written 
communication, continuing through the invention of the printing press, through 
the inventions of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries until the internet (2010).  
 
This “big picture” perspective is similar to the view of Bruce Bimber who argues 
the arrival of the internet is simply another in a series of information revolutions in 
the American context, following newspapers, the telegraph and broadcast 
technologies. Each revolution is disruptive, he suggests, because it offers new 
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access to information, and with information comes influence and the ability to 
affect political outcomes (2003). Diplomacy, too, has evolved with these 
information revolutions. Assuming that this is the era that changes everything 
about public diplomacy risks ignoring valuable context available to teach that at 
its core, diplomacy is about the message, not about the medium used to deliver 
it. 
 
Seeking to provide context for discussion about the introduction of technology 
into a new environment, one historian notes “Technology is neither good nor bad; 
nor is it neutral” (Kranzberg, 1986, p. 545). The same scholar speaks about the 
need to distinguish between utopian goals and practical realities when 
considering a new technology’s possible applications. The question facing public 
diplomacy scholars and practitioners today is not whether social media has 
public diplomacy applications, but rather how best to exploit social media 
technologies for the practice of public diplomacy. 
 
Writing about public diplomacy, Jan Melissen notes it is “similar to propaganda in 
that it tries to persuade people what to think, but it is fundamentally different… in 
the sense that public diplomacy also listens to what people have to say” (2005, p. 
18). Social media makes it possible to listen in ways previously not possible. R.S. 
Zaharna elaborates on this idea writing that networks are “the new model of 
persuasion in the international arena and will define America’s effectiveness as a 
new paradigm of public diplomacy” (2005, p. 1). Inherent in these discussions of 
networks and social media is the idea of multidirectional communication, not the 
one-way model associated with traditional mass media and long-time 
propaganda methods. 
 
Speaking of the American approach to public diplomacy, another scholar writes 
“The U.S. government has traditionally approached public diplomacy as a two-
track process, employing a one-way track of information dissemination while 
arguing that the effort is mutually beneficial in outcome. The network model of 
public diplomacy requires a movement beyond the one-way dissemination of 
information to foreign publics toward a more dialogic engagement with the target 
populations” (Izadi, 2009, p. 56). The challenge for the United States is to employ 
social media to facilitate true conversation. This is the practice of listening that 
Cull regularly urges be prioritized above all else (2011). 
 
Much like the disruptions to established media institutions resulting from the 
former audience (Rosen, 2006) acquiring a voice, established public diplomacy 
practices are ripe for overhaul since the foreign publics to which messages are 
broadcast now themselves have the tools to participate. Just as traditional media 
that fails to interact with its audience is seen as behind the times and neglecting 
an important constituency, so too are nations that fail to engage the publics with 
whom they seek to interact and whose opinions they wish to influence. 
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American public diplomacy 2.0 
 
There is danger of irrational exuberance when entering into discussions about 
the use of social media in the practice of public diplomacy 2.0. Scholars caution 
“it is important not to confuse the internet itself with the content that is exchanged 
or accessed over it… The technology creates the means. The people that use it 
define the ends to which it is put” (Westcott, 2008, p. 3). In other words, 
equipping public diplomats with social media technology does not ensure the 
successful delivery of a message. Nor does it guarantee the message’s favorable 
response upon receipt. Internet realist Evgeny Morozov is blunt in his analysis of 
the place of social media in public diplomacy, arguing that putting more diplomats 
in front of computers to use social media in public diplomacy efforts actually 
clouds the primary issue which is the content itself (2009). 
 
Even before the widespread diffusion of social media, a 2009 report from the 
U.S. Government Accounting Office identified a number of challenges to the 
Department of State’s ability to execute public diplomacy and raised questions 
about whether American interests were being “adequately addressed” (p. 2). The 
implication was that the Department struggled not only with message 
transmission, but also with message formulation. The report expressed concern 
that State’s “failure to adapt in this dynamic communications environment could 
significantly raise the risk that U.S. public diplomacy efforts could become 
increasingly irrelevant” (p. 31). The Department of State under Secretary Hillary 
Clinton has been faced with both developing a consistent message and ensuring 
its effective dissemination. 
 
It was into this context that Secretary Clinton introduced the concept of 21st 
Century Statecraft. Speaking of State’s much-commented upon digital outreach 
efforts, Seib writes “The big question, to which there is not yet a definitive 
answer, is, does this technology-based approach work better, or at least as well, 
as more traditional contact techniques?” (2012, p. 121). In the case of Iran, at 
least, historical evidence suggests traditional diplomatic techniques have failed. It 
therefore presents an interesting opportunity for study of the applications of 
social media-driven public diplomacy efforts. 
 
Iran 
 
Speaking of the benefits of virtual diplomacy, one of the State Department’s 
original tweeting diplomats writes “social networking tools are multiplying the 
outreach capabilities of embassies in a way that was never possible when 
engagement was only face-to-face... This does not negate the need for a 
physical presence and personal contact but it does underline the need for 
embassies to learn how to develop and maintain and staff up for virtual 
relationships” (Graffy, 2009). But what about circumstances where a physical 
presence is not possible? What benefits, if any, can social media offer? The case 
of the United States’ deployment of social media in Iran where there is no 
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physical embassy presence offers a unique opportunity to examine the 
technology’s capacity for public diplomacy. 
 
The Department of State’s 21st Century Statecraft declaration describes the 
preferred modern approach to diplomacy as “complementing traditional foreign 
policy tools with newly innovated and adapted instruments of statecraft that fully 
leverage the networks, technologies and demographics of our interconnected 
world” (Department of State, 2010).  The recently introduced Virtual Embassy 
Tehran is an example of efforts to practice 21st Century Statecraft. It is an effort 
undertaken in a difficult situation where the traditional foreign policy tools have 
failed for the last 30 years. While it is too soon to pass final judgment on the 
effort, after a few months it seems fair to call the experiment a well-intentioned 
effort implemented as well as possible given technological and political 
constraints, and by the metrics available for evaluation, one that seems to be 
having a small, but growing impact. 
 
In December 2011, the United States launched Virtual Embassy Tehran. 
Speaking at an event marking the launch, one of the State Department’s senior 
advisors on Iran announced “This is the first of its kind for the State Department, 
a virtual embassy…. Despite our differences with the Iranian regime, we still 
have a deep desire for engagement and dialogue with the Iranian people. So for 
us this is a mission to the Iranian people” (Federal News Service, 2011). 
Although there have not been formal diplomatic relations between the United 
States and Iran for more than 30 years, Iranians still often seek information about 
the United States, whether about travel, politics or culture. The website is 
designed to provide a channel for acquiring that information without 
intermediaries.  
 
A video message from the Secretary of State is available on the website. In it, 
Secretary Clinton says “Because the United States and Iran do not have 
diplomatic relations, we have missed some important opportunities for dialogue 
with you, the citizens of Iran. But today we can use new technologies to bridge 
that gap and promote greater understanding between our two countries and the 
peoples of each country, which is why we established this virtual embassy” 
(Federal News Service, 2011). The message continues with an invitation for 
Iranians to visit the virtual embassy’s Facebook and Twitter pages in order to 
“leave your thoughts and ideas about how we can engage even more and 
deepen our relationship” (Foreign News Service, 2011). 
 
Iranians are accepting that invitation. As of this writing, the State Department’s 
Persian language Facebook page has 61,712 likes. The Twitter account has 
10,411 followers and follows 171 Twitter users in return. The YouTube channel 
has 128 videos posted, 670 subscribers and 617,599 video views. The 
Department’s site makes clear the virtual embassy is neither official nor an 
embassy, but that it is intended to serve “as a bridge between the American and 
Iranian people” (Department of State, Virtual Embassy, About Us). It further 
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explains that the site was designed with input from the Iranian people “shaped by 
what you wanted” and it is intended to provide an opportunity for “you” [the 
Iranian people] “to tell us more about what you think and why.” Site 
documentation explains Virtual Embassy Tehran was created “so you can make 
up your own minds about the U.S., our concerns about the Iranian government’s 
activities at home and abroad, and our serious efforts to achieve a resolution to 
those concerns.” 
 
Explaining the virtual embassy’s origins, a State Department representative says 
“we needed an information headquarters – a hub, if you will – and the notion of 
‘Virtual Embassy Tehran’ was born. It’s information central for Iranians who need 
to know about the U.S., our policies, study opportunities and work visas. That’s 
the same service an actual brick-and-mortar embassy would provide, so we 
figured ‘why don’t we create a virtual embassy online?’” (Fitzpatrick, 2012). 
Despite Iranian government attempts to block it, the site attracted more than 
300,000 visitors in the first three months with users employing proxy servers and 
virtual private networks (VPNs) to gain access to it and to related social media 
accounts. State Department official Greg Sullivan says “We’re pretty confident 
that this information is going to get out there. It may not be available to everyone 
inside of Iran, but we’re pretty confident that – you know, that there’s going to be 
some sophisticated users that are able to get the information and actually, you 
know, make sure it gets around to others” (Fitzpatrick, 2012). 
 
Concerning the Iranian government’s efforts to block the site and related 
technologies, Sullivan says “We have heard that 40% of Iran’s web traffic 
bypasses government filters. We estimate there are as many as 14 million 
Facebook users inside of Iran despite the fact that Facebook is one of five million 
or so sites blocked for use by Iranian Internet Service Providers” (Fitzpatrick, 
2012). Department officials suggest Iran faces what is often referred to as the 
“dictator’s dilemma” -- the fact that the regime itself derives economic and other 
benefit from the internet and it therefore jeopardizes its own well-being by 
shutting off the flow of the internet into the country altogether. 
 
In terms of the virtual embassy’s role in overall American strategy toward Iran, 
Sullivan says “In many ways, our efforts to reach out to people connects with our 
methods to put pressure on the regime” (Fitzpatrick, 2012). The Department’s 
spokesperson on Iran, Alan Eyre, seconds this noting “U.S. policy toward Iran is 
to increase the pressure on this country… Our intention is for the Iranian people 
to have the opportunity to establish relations with other world peoples” (Jafarov & 
Khatinoglu, 2011). 
 
The text of the virtual embassy website employs the term “engagement” but as 
implied earlier, there is little evidence of real opportunities for it. The site consists 
of a page dedicated to debunking myths about the United States and there is 
visa information for students and others who wish to travel to the United States. 
Sullivan acknowledges the one-way information flow comprising the site’s 
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content, but he emphasizes the Facebook, Twitter and YouTube opportunities 
previously discussed. He also mentions a blog launched about the same time as 
the virtual embassy. The day of the virtual embassy’s launch, for example, there 
were 117 participants seeking to interact with American representatives. 
 
Media coverage of the continuing virtual endeavor mentions several Google+ 
hangouts with Alan Eyre, the Department’s face to Iran. The Department has 
also launched an effort called “Ask Alan” calling it “a new effort to engage with 
the Iranian people through our Persian language social media brand…[It] is 
active on Facebook, YouTube and Twitter” (Department of State, “Ask Alan”, 
2011). In practice, Ask Alan involves the production of a 5 to 7 minute video 
every month produced in response to questions supplied by Iranians on pre-set 
topics. The first topic was visas. Alan also appears on various United States 
international broadcasters, including Voice of America. He is increasingly the 
face (and the voice) of the United States in Iran. 
 
Analysis 
 
The Virtual Embassy Tehran is a serviceable application of the language and 
goals presented in the 21st Century Statecraft document and its redefinition of 
diplomacy. That document states “No longer is diplomacy conducted purely 
government to government or government to people. It is now conducted people 
to people and people to government” (2010). This is the definition of public 
diplomacy. Such a statement makes clear the Department’s intent to exploit 
social media for diplomatic purposes, particularly on the public diplomacy front. 
And, in the case of Iran, where there is no formal diplomatic relationship, 
technology provides a way to plant the seed for future, more robust relations. 
 
Several years ago, an article in a public relations journal discussed the role of 
symbolism in public diplomacy (Zhang, 2006). The context of the study was the 
international humanitarian response to the Asian tsunami in 2004. The typology 
presented in that article is broadly applicable here, particularly given the technical 
difficulties associated with achieving substantive give and take with the Iranian 
people at this moment. In that article, the author discussed the roles of identity, 
symbols, interactions and power relations in creating and sustaining a 
relationship based on public diplomacy principles.  
 
The case of the United States’ Virtual Embassy in Tehran fits nicely into the 
categories Zhang employed. The virtual embassy seeks to begin rebuilding a 
bilateral relationship that has been stagnant for three decades. For much of that 
time, the United States has been portrayed to the Iranian people by their 
government as a treacherous enemy. Rather than trying to re-introduce the 
broader American brand, the Virtual Embassy Tehran project and associated 
social media instead reach out to the Iranian people and do so with a friendly 
face attached. If public diplomacy is intended to be about people-to-people 
relationships, then what better way to forge those relationships than in the form 
GMJ  F12  RP2  Metzgar                                                                            11 
 
 
of an American who speaks the language and who can engage in conversation in 
all forms of media? 
 
With respect to symbols, certainly a virtual embassy is no replacement for the 
large operation a bricks-and-mortar institution brings to a host country. However, 
lacking the opportunity to establish such a real-world institution, the development 
of social media-based contacts and interactions that can begin to approximate 
some of the most basic functions an embassy serves from the perspective of the 
host country population is a creative start. Criticizing the operation as being less 
effective, less present and less permanent than a brick-and-mortar institution 
emanating from establishment of formal bilateral ties misses the point. The 
message the virtual embassy sends is that when traditional diplomacy fails -- and 
it has failed for the last 30 years -- public diplomacy might be able to find a way 
pry the door open a bit. 
 
On the subject of interactions, clearly the quality and quantity of interactions 
facilitated by the virtual embassy and related social media outlets is not the same 
as that seen elsewhere in American PD 2.0 efforts in relationships with countries 
with which the United States has formal diplomatic relations and in which internet 
access is largely unimpeded. But that does not mean efforts to engage, however 
limited, have no value. A recent report from the Congressional Research Service 
notes State Department leadership has testified that some “democracy promotion 
funding has been [dedicated] to train[ing] Iranians in the use of technologies that 
undermine regime internet censorship efforts” (Katzman, 2012, p. 69). Creating 
and sustaining the virtual embassy and related social media components can be 
seen as an effort to give the internet-savvy on the ground in Iran something with 
which to interact. 
 
With respect to power relations, the fourth category Zhang presents in the 
discussion of symbolism in public diplomacy, scholars have long observed that 
information revolutions can disrupt established institutions. This is certainly true 
in the international political context. For 30 years the United States has had no 
formal diplomatic relations with Iran. As State Department spokespeople have 
indicated, such a long absence of normal relations has led to a lack of familiarity 
between Americans and Iranians. Iranians in-country have been deprived of the 
chance to meet Americans and visiting official Americans have been deprived of 
the chance to meet Iranians at home. The result is a dearth of the people-to-
people interactions that form the backbone of stable bilateral relationships.  
 
It is the people-to-people relationships that comprise soft power and without the 
opportunity to exercise soft power, public diplomacy efforts cannot succeed. 
Power is the one public diplomacy component discussed by Zhang that is 
missing from the United States-Iran equation. However, information technology 
now offers an opportunity to begin filling that empty reservoir of American soft 
power influence in Iran. For now, the flow of information may be kept to a trickle, 
but in the same way that desert rains yield vibrant blooms, one hopes the 
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interactions between Americans and Iranians, facilitated by communication 
technologies as described here, will someday blossom into a vibrant bilateral 
relationship. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Continued strains between the United States and Iran may prevent these efforts 
from going much further at present. But given a vacuum of 30 years without 
diplomatic relations, it is indeed necessary to start somewhere. Why not embrace 
social media technology in an effort to do what that technology does best -- bring 
people together? 
 
The question in the case of American digital outreach to Iran is whether digital 
outreach is better than none at all. In the interest of the principles of public 
diplomacy the answer needs to be yes. The conversation may be limited, 
monitored, stilted and leading nowhere obvious in the short-term, but the fact that 
there are conversations taking place is important. The State Department’s Virtual 
Embassy Tehran is an example of an attempt to be proactive rather than 
reactive. The measurable effects may be limited in the short-term, but public 
diplomacy has an important role to play in attaining long-term goals and when 
talking about rebuilding ties between the people of countries without formal 
diplomatic ties, slow, gradual progress is still better than no progress at all. 
Indeed, as Lynn White Junior wrote in 1962, a new technology “merely opens a 
door, it does not compel one to enter” (p. 28).  
 
A recent opinion piece in the New York Times considered the void caused by 
lack of conversation in society. The author noted, “We are tempted to think that 
our little ‘sips’ of online connection add up to a big gulp of real conversation. But 
they don’t. E-mail, Twitter, Facebook, all of these have their places… But no 
matter how valuable, they do not substitute for conversation” (Turkle, 2012). The 
same conclusion must be drawn about the Virtual Embassy Tehran and related 
social media efforts. Such efforts are only preferable to no contact at all. Should 
formal diplomatic relations ever resume between the United States and Iran, a 
relatively static website and a few social media accounts will not suffice. For now, 
however, it must be enough. 
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